ABSTRACT: Current approaches to access control on Web servers do not scale to enterprise-wide systems, since they are mostly based on individual users. Therefore, we were motivated by the need to manage and enforce the strong access control technology of RBAC in large-scale Web environments. RBAC is a successful technology that will be a central component of emerging enterprise security infrastructures. Cookies can be used to support RBAC on the Web, holding users' role information. However, it is insecure to store and transmit sensitive information in cookies. Cookies are stored and transmitted in clear text, which is readable and easily forged.
Introduction
WWW is commonplace. Increased integration of Web, operating system, and database system technologies will lead to continued reliance on Web technology for enterprise computing. However, current approaches to access control on Web servers are mostly based on individual users; therefore, they do not scale to enterprise-wide systems.
A successful marriage of the Web and a strong and e cient access control technology has potential for considerable impact on and deployment of e ective enterprise-wide security in large-scale systems. Role-based access control (RBAC) San98] is a promising technology for managing and enforcing security in large-scale enterprise-wide systems, and it will be a central component of emerging enterprise security infrastructures. We were motivated by the need to manage and enforce the strong access control technology of RBAC in large-scale Web environments.
To support RBAC on the Web, we chose a relatively mature technology, cookieswidely used on the Web -and have extended it for our purpose. Cookies were invented to maintain continuity and state on the Web KM97, KM98] . Cookies contain strings of text characters encoding relevant information about the user. Cookies are sent to the user's memory via the browser while the user is visiting a cookie-using Web site, and are stored on the user's hard disk after the browser is closed. The Web server gets those cookies back and retrieves the user's information from the cookies when the user later returns to the same Web site or domain. The purpose of a cookie is to acquire information and use it in subsequent communications between the Web server and the browser without asking for the same information again. Often a Web server sets a cookie to hold a pointer, such as an identi cation number, as a user-speci c primary key of the information database maintained in the server. Technically, it is not di cult to make a cookie carry relevant information. For instance, a merchant Web server could use a cookie containing the user's name and credit card number. This is convenient for users, since they do not have to read lengthy numbers from their cards and key these in for every transaction. However, it is not safe to store and transmit this sensitive information in cookies because cookies are insecure. Cookies are stored and transmitted in clear text, which is readable and easily forged. Therefore, we should render secure cookies to carry and store sensitive data in them.
We will provide secure cookies with three types of security services: authentication, integrity, and con dentiality. Authentication services verify the owner of the cookies. Integrity services protect cookies against the threat that the contents of the cookies might be changed by unauthorized modi cation. Finally, con dentiality services protect cookies against the values of the cookies being revealed to an unauthorized entity. Details for these techniques have varying degrees of security and convenience for users and system administrators 1 .
In this paper, we will describe how we implemented RBAC with role hierarchy FCK95, SCFY96] on the Web using the secure cookies. To provide security services to secure cookies, we used CGI scripts and the PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) package, which are already in widespread current use.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2, we describe the technologies most relevant to our work, such as RBAC, cookies, and PGP. In Section 3, we describe security threats to cookies, and how to design secure cookies to support RBAC on the Web. In Section 4, we describe how we actually implemented RBAC on the Web by secure cookies, using CGI scripts and PGP on an existing Web server. Section 5 gives our conclusions.
2 Related Technologies 2.1 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Role-based access control (RBAC) San98] has rapidly emerged in the 1990s as a promising technology for managing and enforcing security in large-scale enterprise-wide systems. The 1 For secure communications on the Web, we may consider using other existing technologies, such as, SHTTP (Secure HTTP RS98, SR98]) and SSL (Secure Socket Layer WS96]). However, these technologies cannot solve the stateless problem of HTTP. Furthermore, none of these can prevent end-system threats to cookies.
basic notion of RBAC is that permissions are associated with roles, and users are assigned to appropriate roles. This greatly simpli es security management.
A role is a semantic construct forming the basis of access control policy. With RBAC, system administrators can create roles, grant permissions to those roles, and then assign users to the roles on the basis of their speci c job responsibilities and policy. Therefore, role-permission relationships can be prede ned, which makes it simple to assign users to the prede ned roles. Without RBAC, it is di cult to determine what permissions have been authorized for what users.
RBAC is a promising alternative to traditional discretionary and mandatory access controls, and ensures that only authorized users are given access to certain data or resources. It also supports three well-known security policies: data abstraction, least-privilege assignment, and separation of duties.
Cookies
At present, there are many browsers that support cookies, including Netscape, MS Internet Explorer, GNNWorks, NetCruiser and OmniWeb. Cookies have been used for many purposes on the Web, such as selecting display mode (e.g., frames or text only), shopping cart selections, and carrying names, passwords, account numbers, or some other bits of identifying data on the user's machine. Although there are many ways to use cookies on the Web, the basic process and the contents of cookies are similar. The detailed cookie speci cations are available in KM97, KM98] .
Whenever a browser sends an HTTP request for a URL to a Web server, only those cookies relevant to that server will be sent by the browser. If the server nds any cookies that are related to the server, those cookies are used during this communication between the browser and the server. However, if the server does not nd any cookies speci ed for it, either that server does not use cookies in the communication or the server creates new cookies for subsequent communication between the browser and the server.
Web servers may update the contents of their cookies for any speci c circumstance. The cookie-issuer is not important for cookie validation. In other words, a server can create cookies for other servers in the domain. This is an important aspect of cookies that will be used in our implementations described in Section 4.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), a popular software package originally developed by Phil Zimmermann, is widely used by the Internet community to provide cryptographic routines for e-mail, le transfer, and le storage applications Zim95]. A proposed Internet standard has been developed CDFT98], specifying use of PGP. It uses existing cryptographic algorithms and protocols and runs on multiple platforms. It provides data encryption and digital signature functions for basic message protection services.
PGP is based on public-key cryptography. It de nes its own public-key pair management system and public-key certi cates. The PGP key management system is based on the relationship between key owners, rather than on a single infrastructure such as X.509.
Basically, it uses RSA for the convenience of the public-key cryptosystem, message digests (MD5, IDEA) for the speed of process, and Di e-Hellman for key exchange. The updated version supports more cryptographic algorithms.
Even though the original purpose of PGP is to protect casual e-mail between Internet users, we decided to use the PGP package. The package is already widely used and satis es our requirements, in conjunction with Web servers via CGI scripts for our implementation to protect cookies. These cookies have role information of the user.
3 Secure Cookies
Security Threats to Cookies
We distinguish three types of threats to cookies: network security threats, end-system threats and cookie-harvesting threats. Cookies transmitted in clear text on the network are susceptible to snooping (for subsequent replay) and to modi cation by network threats. Network threats can be foiled by use of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol WS96] which is widely deployed in servers and browsers. 2 However, SSL can only secure cookies while they are on the network. Once the cookie is in the browser's end system it resides on the hard disk or memory in clear text. Such cookies can be trivially altered and can be easily copied from one computer to another, with or without connivance of the user on whose machine the cookie was originally stored. We call this the end-system threat. The ability to alter cookies allows users to forge authorization information in cookies and to impersonate other users. The ability to copy cookies makes such forgery and impersonation all the easier. Additionally, if an attacker collects cookies by impersonating a site that accepts cookies from the users (who believe that they are communicating with a legitimate Web server), later he can use those harvested cookies for all other sites that accept those cookies. We call this the cookie-harvesting threat. These attacks are all relatively easy to carry out and certainly do not require great hacker expertise.
Designing Secure Cookies for RBAC on the Web
In this subsection, we describe how to transform regular cookies -which have zero security -into secure cookies, which provide the classic security services against the three types of threats to cookies (described in the previous subsection).
Secure cookies provide three types of security services: authentication, integrity, and con dentiality services. Selection of the kinds and contents of secure cookies depends on applications and a given situation. However, at least one authentication cookie and the Seal Cookie -which provides the integrity service to the cookies -must be used with other cookies to frame basic security services, regardless of applications. Figure 1 shows a set of secure cookies that we will create and use for RBAC on the Web. The Name Cookie contains the user's name (e.g., Alice), and the Role Cookie holds 2 In many cases due to export restrictions from USA only weak keys (40 bits) are supported, but SSL technology is intrinsically capable of very strong protection against network threats. Figure 1 : A Set of Secure Cookies for RBAC on the Web the user's role information (e.g., Director). The Life Cookie is used to hold the lifetime of the secure-cookie set in its Cookie Value eld and enables the Web server to check the integrity of the lifetime of the secure-cookie set. To protect these cookies from possible attacks, we will use IP Cookie, Pswd Cookie, and Seal Cookie. Authentication cookies (i.e., IP Cookie and Pswd Cookie) verify the owner of the cookies by comparing the authentication information in the cookies to those coming from the users. The IP Cookie holds the IP number of the user's machine, and the Pswd Cookie holds the user's encrypted passwords. This con dentiality service protects the values of the cookies from being revealed to unauthorized entity. In our implementation, we used the IP Cookie and Pswd Cookie together to show the feasibility, but only one of those authentication cookies can be used to provide the authentication service. The choice of an authentication cookie depends on the situation. 3 Finally, the Seal Cookie -which has the digital signature of the cookie-issuing server on the secure cookie set -supports integrity service, protecting cookies against the threat that the contents of the cookies might be changed by unauthorized modi cation.
There are basically two cryptographic technologies applicable for secure cookies: publickey-based and secret-key-based solutions. In our implementation, we use the public-keybased solution for security services provided by a PGP package via CGI scripts. In the next section, we will describe secure cookie creation, veri cation, and use of the role information in the Role Cookie for RBAC with role hierarchies, in turn. It is also possible for authentication to be based on use of RADIUS RRSW97], Kerberos SNS88, Neu94], and similar protocols. Our focus in this work is on techniques that make secure cookies self-su cient rather than partly relying on other security protocols, which is always possible. Figure 2 shows a schematic of RBAC on the Web. The role server has user-role assignment information for the domain. After a successful user authentication, the user receives his or her assigned roles in the domain from the role server. Later, when the user requests access to a Web server with the assigned roles in the domain, the Web server allows the user to execute transactions based on the user's roles instead of identity. The Web servers may have role hierarchies or constraints based on their policies. However, how can the Web servers trust the role information presented by users? For instance, a malicious user may have unauthorized access to the Web servers by using forged role information. Therefore, we must protect the role information from being forged by any possible attacks on the Web as well as in the end-systems.
There can be many possible ways to support the above requirement. In this paper, as one possible solution, we will describe how to protect the role information from possible threats using secure cookies, and how we implemented RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) with role hierarchy on the Web. Figure 3 shows how the secure cookies (including a Role Cookie) for RBAC are created and used on the Web. If a user, let's say Alice, wants to execute transactions in the Web servers in an RBAC-compliant domain, she rst connects to the role server in the beginning of the session. After the role server authenticates Alice, it nds Alice's explicitly assigned roles in the URA (User-Role Assignment SP98, SB97]) database and creates a set of secure cookies: Name Cookie, Life Cookie, Role Cookies, IP Cookie, Pswd Cookie, and Seal Cookie. Then, those secure cookies are sent to and stored in Alice's hard drive securely so that Alice does not need to go back to the role server to get her assigned roles until the cookies expire. Namely, she can use the roles in her Role Cookie securely in the RBAC-compliant domain as long as the cookies are valid.
When Alice requests access to a Web server -which has PRA (Permission-Role As- The Web server decrypts the value of the Pswd Cookie by using the corresponding key to read the user's passwords. Finally, the Web server checks the integrity of the cookies by verifying role server's digital signature in the Seal Cookie using the role server's public key. If all the cookies are valid and veri ed successfully, the Web server trusts the role information in the Role Cookie and uses it for RBAC with a role hierarchy and permission-role assignment information in the Web server.
Secure Cookie Creation
When a user, Alice, connects to the role server (which supports HTTP) of the domain with her Web browser, she is prompted by the HTML form to type in her user ID and passwords for the domain. We used the POST 4 method to send the information to the role server and the ACTION eld to specify our Cookie-Set CGI program (set-cookie.cgi), to which the form data is passed. Figure 4 
is a collaborational diagram in UML (Uni ed Modeling 4
The GET request is very similar to the POST except that the values of the form variable are sent as part of the URL. However, the POST method sends the data after all their request headers have been sent to the server. The Web server receives the request headers, which include the address to the \set-cookie.cgi" program on the server. The server translates the headers into environment variables and executes the program. The \set-cookie.cgi" program rst retrieves the user ID and passwords, and the IP number of the client machine from the environment variable, REMOTE ADDR. The program authenticates the user by comparing the user ID and passwords with the ones in the authentication database. 5 It then assigns the user to roles by matching the user ID and the corresponding roles from the URA (User-Role Assignment) database.
Subsequently, a subroutine for encryption is called to another CGI program (encrypt.cgi), which uses PGP to encrypt the passwords by the cookie-verifying Web server's public key. These encrypted passwords will be stored in the Pswd Cookie by the \set-cookie.cgi" program. Then, the \set-cookie.cgi" program creates IP Cookie, Pswd Cookie, Name Cookie, Life Cookie, and Role Cookie, giving each cookie the corresponding value: IP number of the client machine, encrypted passwords, user's name, lifetime of the cookie set, and assigned roles.
To support the integrity service of the cookies, the \set-cookie.cgi" program calls another CGI program (sign.cgi), which uses PGP to sign on the message digest with the role server's private key. The \set-cookie.cgi" then creates the Seal Cookie, which includes the digital signature of the role server on the message digest of the cookies.
Finally, the Web server sends the HTTP response header, along with the cookies, back to the user's browser, and the cookies are stored in the browser until they expire. These secure cookies will be veri ed and used in the Web servers as described in the following subsections. Figure 5 is an actual snapshot of a set of secure cookies from our implementation that are stored in the user's machine after the cookies are generated by the cookie-issuing Web server. The contents of the cookies exactly re ect the ones presented in Figure 1 . Each Figure 6 is a collaborational diagram in UML style notation for secure cookie veri cation. This diagram shows how we verify (corresponding to the right side of Figure 3 ) the set of secure cookies that we generated in the previous subsection for our implementation. When Alice connects to a Web server (which accepts the secure cookies) in an RBAC-compliant domain, the connection is redirected to the \index.cgi" program. The related secure cookies are sent to the Web server and she is prompted by the HTML form to type in her user ID and passwords. The \index.cgi" program rst uses the HTTP COOKIE environment variable to retrieve the secure cookies (Name Cookie, Life Cookie, Role Cookies, IP Cookie, Pswd Cookie, and Seal Cookie) for the Web server. It then checks the validity of all the cookies. The two IP addresses, one from the IP cookie and the other from the environment variable, REMOTE ADDR, are compared. If they are identical, then the host-based authentication is passed, and a hidden eld \status" with the value of \IP-passed" is created to indicate that this stage was passed 6 . However, if the IP numbers are di erent, the user When the user submits her user ID and passwords to the server, the Web server translates the request headers into environment variables, and another CGI program, \password-ver.cgi," is executed. We used the POST method to send the information to the Web server and the ACTION eld to specify the CGI program (password-ver.cgi) to which the form data are passed. The rst thing the \password-ver.cgi" does is to check the hidden eld \status" to see if the previous stage was successfully completed. If this is \IP-passed," the program decrypts the value of the Pswd Cookie (encrypted user password) using the PGP with the Web server's private key, since it was encrypted with the Web server's public key by the role server. The program (password-ver.cgi) then compares the two passwords: one from the user and the other decrypted from the Pswd Cookie. If they are identical, then the user-based authentication is passed, and a hidden eld \status" with the value of \password-passed" is created to indicate that this stage was passed. However, if the two passwords are di erent, the user has to start again by either retyping the passwords or receiving new cookies from the role server.
Secure Cookie Veri cation
After the password veri cation is completed, another CGI program, \signature-ver.cgi," is activated to check the integrity of the cookies. Like the other programs, it rst checks the value of \status" passed on from the previous program, and it proceeds only if it shows the user has been through the password veri cation stage. If the value is \password-passed," then the program veri es the signature in the Seal Cookie with the role server's public key using PGP. If the integrity is veri ed, it means that the cookies have not been altered, and a hidden eld \status" with the value of \verify-passed" is created to indicate that this stage was passed and forwarded to the nal program, \rbac.cgi." This program uses the role information in the Role Cookie for role-based access control in the server as described in the following subsection. However, if the signature veri cation is failed, the user has to start again by receiving new cookies from the role server.
directly with forged cookies. 
RBAC in the Web Server
After verifying all the secure cookies, the Web server allows the user, Alice, to execute transactions based on her roles, contained in the Role Cookie, instead of her identity. In other words, the Web server does not care about the user's identity for authorization purposes. This resolves the scalability problem of the identity-based access control, which is being used mostly in existing Web servers. Furthermore, the Web server can also use a role hierarchy, which supports a natural means for structuring roles to re ect an organization's lines of authority and responsibility. Each Web server may have a role hierarchy de erent from that in other servers. In our implementation, we used a role hierarchy in the Web server, depicted in Figure 7 . The location of RBAC-compliant Web servers is geographically free from that of the role server, since cookies can be issued by one Web server for use by others, regardless of their physical location. If the \rbac.cgi" program in Figure 6 receives the value, \verify-passed," from the previous veri cation step, it means that the cookies have successfully passed all the veri cation stages, such as IP, passwords, and signature veri cation. Therefore, the Web server can trust the role information in the Role Cookie, and uses it for role-based access control in the server.
Suppose Alice has the role DIR 7 in her Role Cookie and she wants to access resources for PE1 -which require the PE1 role or roles senior to the PE1 role in the role hierarchy -in a Web server. First, she has to prove that the cookies she is presenting are genuine. To prove this, she has to go through all the veri cation steps: IP, passwords, and signature veri cation. She cannot jump ahead or skip any veri cation stage, as each program requires a hidden eld, \status," from the previous stage. After the Web server has successfully completed all the veri cation steps, the \rbac.cgi" program retrieves the role information, DIR, from Alice's Role Cookie, and shows all the available roles 8 based on the role hierarchy depicted in Figure 7 . Since she wants access to the pages that require PE1's privilege, she chooses the PE1 role to activate it among her available roles. Then she has the permissions assigned to the PE1 role and the roles junior to PE1, such as E1, ED and E. Now, when Alice requests access to a particular page in the server, the page checks if her activated role, PE1, has permission to access the page.
The user can use any roles among her available roles by activating them. For instance, if Alice would activate PL1, then she would be allowed to access the pages, which require the PE1 role, since PL1 is senior to PE1 in the role hierarchy. However, if she were to activate E1, then she would not be allowed to access the pages, since E1 is junior to PE1. This supports least privileges, since only those permissions required for the tasks are turned on by activating the required role.
How then can the Web server protect the pages from being accessed by unauthorized users? Suppose a malicious user, Bob, has the role PE1 but wishes to access pages that require the PL1 role. He could change the value of his Role Cookie so that it has PL1, or roles senior to PL1. He would go through the password veri cation stages, since he would be able to log in as Bob by using his own passwords. However, when his Seal Cookie is being veri ed, there would be a problem, as the signature veri cation would fail. Therefore, he would not be allowed to move beyond this stage. On the other hand, he could try accessing the pages directly by typing the URLs. This would not be allowed, since each page checks to see if he has activated the required role, PL1, or roles senior to PL1. In other words, Bob is not allowed to access the pages, which require roles senior to his, because he cannot activate the senior roles, which are out of his available role range.
As a result, the Web server allows only users, who have gone through all the verication steps with the secure cookies (Name Cookie, Life Cookie, Role Cookies, IP Cookie, Pswd Cookie, Seal Cookie), to access the pages. This access also is possible only if the users have the required roles and activate them among their available roles based on the role hierarchy.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have described how we implemented RBAC with role hierarchies on the Web using secure cookies. To protect the role information in the cookies, we provided security services, such as authentication, con dentiality, and integrity, to the cookies using PGP and CGI scripts in the Web servers. The cookie-issuing Web server creates a set of secure cookies including the user's role information, and other Web servers use the role information for RBAC with role hierarchies after cookie veri cation. This access control mechanism solves the scalability problem of existing Web servers. The use of secure cookies is a transparent process to users and applicable to existing Web servers and browsers. 8 In this example, all the roles from E to DIR are available to Alice, since she has the senior most role in the role hierarchy.
